Tensions between Baku and Moscow flared in late June erstwhile Russian police arrested dozens of cultural Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg. This group were linked to a series of unsolved murders from over a decade ago. Among them were Huseyn and Ziyaddin Safarov, who were declared dead while in custody. Russian authorities said that 1 died of a heart attack and offered no explanation for the other. But erstwhile the 2 brothers’ bodies were returned to Baku, an Azerbaijani autopsy concluded both died from severe blood failure and shock caused by extended physical trauma.
This event set off a chain reaction, especially with fresh memories of the December 2024 crash involving Azerbaijani Airlines flight 8243, which was reportedly shot down by a Russian missile. The arrest of both Sputnik journalists and average Russians working in the IT sector in Baku, followed by the Kremlin’s retaliation with the detention of the leader of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Yekaterinburg, has fuelled a simmering confrontation between the 2 governments. Azerbaijani government-aligned media groups are now moving uncharacteristically sharp anti-Russian propaganda pieces, while rumours circulate that more than 300 Russian-language schools across Azerbaijan may shortly be shut down.
Most global commentary has interpreted these tensions as a serious rift, possibly provoking a pro-West geopolitical realignment in Azerbaijan. For example, there has been speculation that “Putin is besides losing Azerbaijan” and “Is Moscow losing Azerbaijan as an ally?”. global observers are hinting that this rift could end up triggering a “massive realignment in global power balances” – possibly in favour of the West. Even Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy appeared to embrace this interpretation, and in turn expressed support for Baku against Russia’s “threatening” of the country. Much of this speculation is besides connected to Armenia-Azerbaijan developments in the South Caucasus. Many observers have connected the rift to a USA proposal to manage the contentious Zangezur corridor – a way linking mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave through confederate Armenia – which would sideline Russia, and to advancement toward a long-awaited peace treaty between Yerevan and Baku. According to any analysts, these developments would “push out” Moscow from the South Caucasus and “cost” Putin his grip over a region he has traditionally regarded as his “backyard”.
How deep is the rift really?
Although a reassessment of Baku-Moscow ties is surely warranted, we argue that fresh commentary has frequently veered into sensationalism mixed with wishful thinking. We believe that the rift between Azerbaijan and Russia is far little severe than portrayed. In fact, rumours about the closure of Russian schools have for the minute proven unsubstantiated, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called for restraint between the 2 sides, and both the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments have expressed issues over the USA proposal of managing the Zangezur corridor. Moreover, Moscow has welcomed dialog between Yerevan and Baku, expressing support for a swift peace deal. In reality, it is Azerbaijan that has stalled the peace process, adding tough preconditions after the treaty text was already agreed upon. The initiative has clearly been in Baku’s hands, not Moscow’s. Therefore, it is amazing that many global observers frame fresh events in the region as a decisive blow to the Kremlin’s influence.
Arguably, observers have been overlooking the many factors that constrain a full breakdown in Azerbaijan-Russia ties and prevent a sharp pivot toward the West. In particular, these affect Baku’s long-time and established multi-vector abroad policy, and structural economical factors tying Russia and Azerbaijan together. The current tensions with the Kremlin are consistent with this strategy alternatively than a departure from it. We will now discuss more in depth these constraining factors.
Aliyev’s deceptive pendulum between Russia and the West
Both Ilham Aliyev and his father Heydar Aliyev before him have traditionally conducted a calculated multi-vector abroad policy aimed at balancing relations with Russia, Iran, Turkey, the West, and now increasingly besides China and the Turkic countries of Central Asia. The logic behind this approach is to manoeuvre between competing powers without aligning full with any of them. In the case of Azerbaijan, it functions like a deceptive pendulum, swinging between external powers. It is simply a form of strategical ambiguity that allows Baku to extract concessions from different actors and avoid risky entanglements.
Indeed, before the fresh Azerbaijan-Russia tensions, we should bear in head that the 2 countries traversed a period of excellent relations, while links with the West were ambiguous. In particular, between 2021 and 2023, Baku ramped up its anti-western rhetoric, especially against France, which has been accused of being pro-Armenia. Enraged by the European Monitoring Mission sent to patrol confederate Armenia in 2022, the Azerbaijani ambassador to the EU made threats that the EU mission could be shot if members got besides close to the Azerbaijani border. In August 2023, the monitoring mission allegedly even came under Azerbaijani military fire. In the same period, Baku’s deepening ties with Moscow culminated in an alliance agreement signed just 2 days before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As late as December 2024, Aliyev openly praised the agreement as a “milestone” in Russia-Azerbaijan relations, referring to the 2 countries as “allies”. This was a time erstwhile the pendulum was swinging closer to Russia, whose indirect support was needed to favourably deal with Armenia and the Karabakh issue. Indeed, the Russian-led Collective safety Treaty Organization (CSTO) did not come to Armenia’s defence erstwhile it was attacked by Azerbaijan along its confederate border in September 2022, nor did Russian peace-keepers stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh interfere with Azerbaijan’s complete military takeover of the region in September 2023.
Yet, even at the tallness of this pro-Kremlin tilt, Baku maintained ties with the West and especially with the EU. After the invasion of Ukraine, Brussels scrambled for alternatives to Russian gas. In July 2022, Commission president Ursula von der Leyen flew to Baku to sign a memorandum of understanding to double Azerbaijani gas exports to the EU by 2027. possibly due to the request for alternatives to Russian gas, the EU Commission and European Council’s reaction to the September 2023 ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population has been restrained. The EU’s support for Azerbaijan was reconfirmed in February 2024, erstwhile European Council president Charles Michel congratulated Aliyev on his re-election. This is despite global reports pointing to political repression and the absence of any real competition. In April 2025, the EU advanced typical for abroad Affairs and safety Policy, Kaja Kallas, travelled to Baku and publically referred to Azerbaijan as a “reliable partner”. Moreover, Baku has made itself essential to the EU through its function in the mediate Corridor. This east–west way links China to Europe by way of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, avoiding both Russia and Iran. Brussels views the corridor as a channel for importing more critical natural materials, which are vital for the European Green Deal championed by Von der Leyen. The EU–Central Asia Summit held in Samarkand in April 2025 reflects the increasing importance of the Central Asian states as strategical suppliers of critical natural materials, and Azerbaijan as a transit corridor.
In essence, Azerbaijan has been skilfully able to deceptively manoeuvre between Russia and the West, each time benefiting from its ambiguous position. Each side has tried to court Baku to its side, supporting its abroad policy and/or closing an eye to the country’s authoritarian consolidation. But a consistent multi-vector outlook requires stably committing to no side. The fresh Baku-Moscow tensions should, thus, be analysed within this calculated pendulum strategy.
Why Russia inactive matters
Beyond the strategy of multivectorism, respective factors prevent Baku from sacrificing its peculiar relation with Moscow. First, Azerbaijan has so far been unable to meet its gas export commitments to the EU. At the same time, reports have emerged confirming that Baku is helping Russia evade oil sanctions. Persistent suspicions besides linger that Azerbaijan may be expanding imports of Russian gas to fulfil its EU export obligations.
But energy ties are only part of the story. Another key reason a rupture between Moscow and Baku remains improbable is the deep economical integration of Azerbaijani-born businessmen within Russia. Many capitalized on the post-Soviet privatization wave to build powerful empires spanning the energy, real estate, and logistics sectors. Among the most influential is Vagit Alekperov, the erstwhile head of oil giant “Lukoil”. As of March 2025, Forbes ranks him the richest individual in Russia, with a net worth of 28.7 billion US dollars. Lukoil remains a key player in Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon sector, holding around 20 per cent shares of the Shah Deniz gas-condensate field. In 2020, in designation of his contributions to strengthening the ties between Azerbaijan and Russia, Azerbaijani president Aliyev awarded him the “Dostlug” Order for his function in strengthening bilateral ties.
Another major figure is Araz Agalarov, the head of real property empire “Crocus Group”. A known Kremlin loyalist, Agalarov has reportedly secured major state contracts without competition. His boy Emil, a Russian pop star and businessman, was erstwhile married to president Aliyev’s daughter. Through his company, Agalarov Development, he besides maintains active ventures in Azerbaijan. It is besides worth mentioning God Nisanov, 1 of Moscow’s top commercial property tycoons. Nisanov is rumoured to have close ties to Russia’s abroad intelligence chief, Sergey Naryshkin. A series of murky real property deals has been noted involving Naryshkin’s daughter. In fresh years, reports have uncovered business ties between him and the Aliyev household throughout Russia.
Beyond oligarch ties that make enduring economical and political links, Moscow serves as an crucial marketplace for Azerbaijani agricultural exports. Nearly 46 per cent of all remittances sent to Azerbaijan come from Russia, where, according to official figures, over 300,000 Azerbaijanis live and work. If the Kremlin were to take steps that make life importantly harder for these labour migrants, the Azerbaijani government could face serious economical losses and increasing political force at home as thousands return.
Main takeaways
Aliyev is capitalizing on the EU’s urgent request to safe transit routes for critical natural materials essential to the Green Deal, alongside its search for alternate gas sources. This gives him leverage to tilt closer to the EU, gaining immediate economical and political benefits, including closing an eye to increased political repression inside the country. However, this shift follows a fresh swing toward Moscow that lasted until late 2024, and should be contextualized within Baku’s consistent and calculated multi-vector abroad policy. As the pendulum keeps swinging, we should not be amazed if in a fewer years Azerbaijan starts tilting again towards Russia.
In conclusion, the fresh tensions between Baku and Moscow reflect more than just geopolitical posturing. Indeed, they show a individual reckoning between 2 autocrats. Aliyev never accepted Putin’s December 2024 apology over the downing of an Azerbaijani plane, which lacked both an admission of guilt and a thorough investigation. Strengthened by EU political and economical support, and Russia’s increasing weakness, Aliyev is signalling to Putin that he demands more equal relations based on mutual respect, not one-sided deference.
Cesare Figari Barberis is simply a Postdoctoral investigator at the Institute of safety and Global Affairs (ISGA) at Leiden University. His investigation explores the function of emotions in the Caucasus and EU abroad policy.
Leonardo Zanatta is simply a PhD candidate in global relations/political discipline at Corvinus University of Budapest. His doctoral investigation explores Russia’s function in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
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