Ukraine’s ambitious bid for European Union membership, alongside another candidate countries, faces formidable challenges. While formal accession negotiations have commenced for many of them, their advancement is profoundly contingent on continued reforms within these nations and the EU’s ability to accomplish interior consensus on further enlargement.
Ukraine’s ambition to join the European Union represents 1 of the most complex and strategically crucial enlargement processes in the bloc’s history. Initiated amidst the ongoing conflict with Russia, this way is profoundly shaped by the realities of war, including the immense challenges of post-war reconstruction and the critical request for safety guarantees.
While Ukraine has begun formal accession negotiations, its journey is inherently linked to its ability to proceed comprehensive reforms and rebuild, even as hostilities persist.
The possible of accession of fresh members besides brings to light crucial challenges within the EU itself. Achieving genuine consensus among the current 27 associate states on issues of enlargement, interior organization reforms, and the crucial budgetary implications remains a formidable task.
Historical models of fast “big bang” expansions appear little likely given the current geopolitical scenery and differing national priorities. Overcoming these interior divisions and ensuring the essential alignment of government and institutions with EU standards will specify whether and how rapidly fresh countries can advance towards their European future.
The discussion of challenges resulting from EU enlargement and the prospects of candidate countries, especially Ukraine, to join the bloc was held by panelists at the conference Fortress or Frontier? The EU’s Enlargement Dilemma by EURACTIV.pl.
Ukraine’s EU way war’s shadow
”Regarding Ukraine, the current outlook for EU accession is alternatively bleak. And this isn’t just about Ukraine—everything now boils down to winning the war”, said Daniel Szeligowski, Head of east Europe Programme in the Polish Institute of global Affairs (PISM).
He recalled the conditions under which Ukraine was granted EU candidate status. “It all started with the Russian invasion. Unfortunately, this is the point of departure for the full process, and it remains crucial even erstwhile we discuss Ukraine’s EU accession, post-war reconstruction, and recovery,” he insisted.
Szeligowski believes that the degree of Ukraine’s current demolition straight correlates with the ease of its future EU accession, meaning little war harm now will consequence in little rebuilding later and a smoother way to gathering accession criteria.
The expert highlighted Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty, its common defence clause, asserting it’s even stronger than NATO’s Article 5.
“That brings us to the issue of safety guarantees. Right now, very few—if any—European countries are willing to supply specified guarantees to Ukraine. Without addressing the link between safety guarantees and the war, it will be very hard for Ukraine to advance on the EU accession path,” he said.
As he explained, any nations contend that safety guarantees for Ukraine can only be addressed erstwhile the war concludes. Others, including the expert himself, keep that these guarantees should precede the war’s end.
“That could make it easier to end the war, since Ukraine would then know the conditions under which it will operate. But this dilemma remains unresolved, and it importantly complicates matters for Ukraine,” Szeligowski stressed.
“I frequently tell my Ukrainian colleagues that if they join the EU in 10 years—which was more or little the timeline for Poland—that would actually be a success. It’s an optimistic scenario, not a pessimistic one, and shouldn’t be seen as obstruction. There’s inactive a long road ahead,” he concluded.
Pavol Demeš, Slovak abroad Policy Analyst, erstwhile Minister of global Relations, called Ukraine 1 of the most fascinating examples erstwhile it comes to enlargement.
“This is simply a country at war, fighting for its very existence, and over the past 3 and a half years, it has amazed us all,” he said. “Even under wartime conditions, the EU decided to open accession negotiations. And we don’t know erstwhile and how this war will end.”
Agreeing with Szeligowski, Demeš stated that the trajectory of Ukraine’s EU way depends on the war’s end. “How the war ends, how Russia behaves in the coming months, how the US and Russia contribute to the settlement—these will be key,” he said.
Hungary blocks EU enlargement
Nataliya Vinnykova, head of the Department of global Relations at V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, highlighted that formal accession negotiations with Ukraine, initiated in June 2024, have now completed their first year.
She besides noted that these negotiations are organised into clusters and chapters, requiring each candidate country to align its laws and institutions with EU standards.
As of June 2025, Ukraine has submitted the first screening study on Cluster 1—called the “Fundamentals” cluster—which includes judiciary reform, the regulation of law, and public administration, she pointed out, adding that reports on Cluster 2 (Internal Market) and Cluster 6 (External Relations) are expected to be submitted by the end of this month.
“The screening process—which involves a self-assessment of legal alignment—is expected to conclude by autumn 2025. That is the optimistic scenario. But there are real obstacles”, she noted.
The biggest obstacle, she noted, is Hungary, presently blocking the beginning of 2 negotiation clusters slated for June. “This is delaying the process significantly,” she admitted.
Vinnykova stressed that Hungary has presented 11 recommendations, many focused on language requirements, with the primary request being the elimination of state language proficiency requirements for public officials.
“Hungary insists that Ukrainian officials should not be legally required to talk the national language, even in authoritative settings specified as council meetings. This is 1 of the most controversial points,” she explained.
The expert stated that Hungary additionally sought to impose a request on Ukraine for guaranteed representation of national minorities in its parliament.
“However, for now, this request appears to be politically unfeasible, as it would require constitutional changes—something that cannot happen without a nationwide referendum in Ukraine. crucial constitutional amendments would be needed,” she insisted.
“So, what we have at the minute is simply a fast-paced screening process. Ukraine, especially the government, is working to advance this process. But at the same time, Hungary has not yet withdrawn its veto on beginning the first negotiation cluster.”
Vinnykova added that in the current geopolitical climate, “it’s hard to claim that negotiations have truly begun—let alone envision a full and comprehensive accession process.”
“After all, Ukraine is inactive in a state of war,” she emphasised.
Consensus is missing
The Hungarian stance illustrates a deficiency in genuine consensus among EU associate states regarding the issue of enlargement.
“Despite many declarations, I don’t yet see real alignment among capitals on Ukraine’s accession prospects. Declarations are 1 thing; real policy is another,” Szeligowski said.
Jan Kovář, investigation manager at the Institute of global Relations Prague, shared the another speakers’ skepticism about a fast EU accession process, citing a deficiency of consensus on both EU organization improvement and enlargement itself.
“The disagreement spans multiple levels: from structural reforms and organization functioning to circumstantial policy issues that carry advanced fiscal costs, specified as agriculture and cohesion funding,” he said.
“There are only a fewer major backing mechanisms, but they’re all delicate topics—particularly for the current net beneficiaries of the EU budget. And if you introduce new, comparatively poorer associate states, something has to give,” he stressed, adding that either the EU budget has to grow, which he doubted there was a consensus for, or existing policies must be restructured or redirected, which would inevitably mean consequences for current recipients.
In many EU countries, including his native Czech Republic, the bloc’s membership was frequently promoted as an economical deal—a kind of “cash cow,” Kovář said, insisting that the EU was framed as a “rich husband.”
“It was never truly about shared values or political union; it was always a matrimony of convenience,” he pointed out. “I think this communicative was a mistake. due to the fact that if you take the money away, public support evaporates—both for the EU itself and for its enlargement.”
He cited fresh Eurobarometer data showing comparatively low public support for enlargement in Czechia, despite the rhetorical political backing it receives.
“Now imagine telling people, ‘There will be no more funds, no more financial benefits.’ That communicative won’t go down well,” he said.
Rebuilding EU unity is key
In 2004, the 4 countries of the Visegrad 4 joined the EU during the “Big Bang enlargement.”
“At that time, we all had very akin motivations and attitudes toward the EU,” said Demeš. “For us, it was a substance of modernisation—of joining a club that we felt we belonged to. It gave us momentum for improvement and reforms.”
Simultaneously, the EU welcomed fresh members, mostly believing that enlargement served the Union’s interests as much as the fresh states’, he added.He noted that EU accession was happening alongside NATO integration—”so the political, economic, military, and safety dimensions were all closely connected.”
“At that time, there was strong unity—both among the countries joining and those accepting us into the EU and the broader transatlantic community. We didn’t face crucial opposition.”
“Today, erstwhile we talk about further enlargement—whether for east Partnership countries or the Western Balkans—we’re dealing with an entirely different geopolitical landscape.”
Even Washington, a erstwhile champion of Euroatlantic integration, has profoundly changed its stance, the expert noted. “If the president of the United States is saying the EU was created to screw America, then we’re clearly dealing with a completely different abroad policy paradigm erstwhile we talk about the EU and further enlargement,” he pointed out.
According to Demeš, the war in Ukraine exposed V4 fragmentation, with Hungary and Slovakia taking a different stance on Ukraine and Russia than Poland and the Czech Republic. “We’re no longer able to talk with a common voice on enlargement or on the war in Ukraine,” he said.
“Rebuilding unity, both at the regional and the EU level, is simply a shared sense of purpose—keeping the EU together and supporting those knocking on the door—is a primary task for all of us: policymakers, think tankers.”
No “big bang” enlargement
Kovář doesn’t anticipate any more “big bang” EU enlargements like the 1 in 2004. “It’s simply not feasible without interior reforms. Politicians in Western Europe won’t be able to convince their electorates to support enlargement—whether via parliamentary votes or referendums—unless the EU first fixes its interior structures,” he explained.
“That said, possibly we’ll see a “salami slice” approach—one country at a time. But even that has its limits. I don’t believe you can integrate all 9 candidate countries that way.”
He said that if he had to guess, Montenegro could be next to join the EU, as it’s tiny and manageable in terms of population and economy. He added that North Macedonia or Albania could possibly follow, but after that, the process would likely stall again.
“Frankly, I’d be amazed if more than 2 countries join the EU before 2030. And I surely don’t anticipate a large country like Ukraine to join by then,” he remarked.
Szeligowski besides brought upon the subject of the next, post-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, which he said could be the framework to prepare the Union for enlargement. “The following MFF, post-2034, could then support an already enlarged Union,” he pointed out.
Ukraine needs reforms, capacity, support
To a question about what Ukraine needs to facilitate its EU path, Vinnykova pointed out that financial aid “is, of course, essential—and the EU is already the largest donor to Ukraine—but support goes far beyond just money”.
What Ukraine urgently needs now is human capital—staff capable of implementing the reforms essential for EU integration, she remarked, adding that peculiar training campaigns would profoundly help.
“And yes, we should be honest: there is presently a serious shortage of tailored expertise—specific cognition for each sector, each chapter of the accession negotiations.”
Szeligowski pointed to 2 parallel tracks: 1 is the accession procedure, and the another is preparation for accession. “These tracks run simultaneously. That means even if the accession process is blocked, it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be preparing Ukraine for eventual membership. We mustn’t wait for the Hungarian veto to be lifted before getting to work,” the expert said.
When asked how Ukraine could advance its EU accession, he pointed to 3 key steps, the first being gathering the accession criteria through essential reforms.
He utilized a metaphor of traveling on a Polish train. “You go to the station, you never know precisely erstwhile the train will come, but you’re beautiful certain it will—eventually,” he said. “But you should be there erstwhile it does. And more importantly, you request to have a ticket. That ticket is reform. erstwhile the train arrives, it won’t wait. You request to be ready to board immediately.”
That’s what happened in 2022 erstwhile Ukraine was granted EU candidate status, Szeligowski explained, adding that “it didn’t happen just due to geopolitics—there had to be a foundation.”
“Reforms in erstwhile years gave the EU a basis to act. So Ukraine must stay on that improvement path, even though I know how hard and painful the economical reforms will be. But no 1 expects Ukraine to be ready for accession tomorrow. That’s crucial to remember,” Szeligowski said.
The second thing is building organization capacity. “There’s a massive body of EU law and practice that needs to be adopted. This isn’t a negotiation. Apart from a fewer opt-outs or transition periods, there’s very small flexibility. Accession is mostly about implementation, not haggling over terms,”
Thirdly, the accession treaty—no substance how good—will not be enough, according to Szeligowski. “It inactive should be ratified by all 27 associate states. present you might be able to negociate a workaround for the Hungarian veto to open a cluster or two. But that won’t cut it erstwhile it comes to final ratification,” the panelist said.
That’s why Ukraine has to follow Poland’s example, he added. ”During our accession process, we launched a major public relations run in all EU associate state—to persuade both governments and societies that admitting Poland would bring value to the EU,” he said.
“Ukrainian politicians frequently truly believe that it only takes an approval of Berlin or Paris to join the EU. But it doesn’t work like that. Ukraine has to engage all 27 countries—one by one—and convince them that it deserves to join the Union.”
