China Is Unlikely To Play A Major Role In The Ukrainian Endgame

Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack,

The most that China is expected to do is deploy peacekeepers together with other countries per a potentially forthcoming UNSC Resolution that would likely see these forces jointly patrol whatever the “Line of Contact” may be and monitor each side’s compliance with the ceasefire or peace treaty.

Axios reported that Putin “mentioned China as one of the potential guarantors” of Ukraine’s security, which was followed by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov referencing spring 2022’s draft peace treaty that included China as one alongside the other permanent UNSC members. Zelensky then told reporters that “We don’t need guarantors who don’t help Ukraine, and didn’t help Ukraine at the moment when we really needed it. We need security guarantees only from those countries that are ready to help us.”

China’s participation in this framework would be important for reasons of prestige and international law due to it respectively being an emerging superpower and a permanent UNSC member. Nevertheless, China is unlikely to play a major role in the Ukrainian endgame. For instance, it’s not going to deploy peacekeepers to the Russian side of the frontier with Ukraine to face off against Western ones on the other side, nor will it agree to impose crippling sanctions on Russia if the conflict re-erupts in the future.

The most that China is expected to do is deploy peacekeepers together with other countries per a potentially forthcoming UNSC Resolution that would likely see these forces jointly patrol whatever the “Line of Contact” may be and monitor each side’s compliance with the ceasefire or peace treaty. China has always been neutral towards conflicts in which it’s not a direct participant and therefore can’t afford to be seen as taking anyone’s side in the Ukrainian one’s endgame lest it lose its credibility with others.

In this context, its goals are to:

1) present itself as a force for peace in the largest European conflict since WWII;

2) correspondingly enhance its global prestige through participation in any potentially forthcoming UNSC-approved peacekeeping mission;

3) and reopen its overland trade with Ukraine.

To elaborate on the last point, China and Ukraine used to trade with one another via Russia, but it was obviously impossible to continue doing so since the start of the special operation 3,5 years ago.

China’s interests in resuming the use of this corridor are due to it being the quickest and cheapest route to Ukraine, while Ukraine’s are likely driven by the calculation that Russia might be reluctant to strike projects in which China has invested if the conflict ever re-erupts. The most profitable and strategic ones are probably already promised to Ukraine’s Western patrons, but Kiev might allow Chinese companies (especially state-owned ones) to purchase stakes in them as an “deterrent” to Russia per the aforesaid.

Facilitating the resumption of Chinese-Ukrainian trade is also in Russia’s interests since this assumes that Russian-Ukrainian trade would resume as well. After all, it wouldn’t make sense for the Kremlin to agree to facilitate China’s trade with Ukraine without also being allowed to trade with it too, so this arrangement could be part of a grand compromise for ending the conflict. The EU would benefit for the same reason as Ukraine, but the US might thus be wary of this quid pro quo for precisely that reason.

In any case and regardless of however Chinese-Ukrainian trade is conducted in the future, China is unlikely to play a major role in the Ukrainian endgame since neither the US nor Ukraine want it to, while talk about China taking Russia’s side in this scenario is dispelled by the reality of its neutral foreign policy. China is expected to play some role, but it’ll probably be as part of a UNSC-approved multilateral effort, not anything unilateral. That’s alright for China too since it doesn’t want to do anything major anyhow.